The new Belgian Criminal Code (FPS Justice reform overview), published in the Belgian monitor on 8 April 2024 and applicable from 1 September 2026, constitutes the first comprehensive reform of criminal law since 1867. It modernises general principles, restructures penalties into eight graduated levels, and recodifies all offences, providing a clearer and more coherent framework.
This reform also takes place within a European context of strengthening the fight against money laundering and financial crime. The European Union adopted in 2024 the "EU AML Package," which notably includes the Sixth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD6), the AMLR, as well as the creation of a new European Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA). Transposition of AMLD6 must take place by 10 July 2027 at the latest, except for the provisions on beneficial-owner registers (Arts. 11–13 and 15), which were due by 10 July 2026 (see also the UBO Register in Belgium). The AMLR applies from 10 July 2027.

If the Belgian reform does not constitute a mere mechanical transposition of European law, it clearly fits within this dynamic of tightening repressive and preventive measures in financial matters.
In the field of economic and financial criminal law, the reform is primarily manifested by a redefinition of the offense of money laundering and by the recodification of fraudulent organisation of insolvency (former Art. 490bis, now Art. 496). It raises significant challenges for companies and professionals, who need to adapt their internal practices and control mechanisms to comply with a now stricter criminal law.
What are the real new changes in money laundering?
The Code now clearly distinguishes between concealment and money laundering, whereas they were often confused in the past.
Concealment (Art. 501) remains an instantaneous offense, targeting the taking of possession or transfer of property obtained by means of an offence committed by another person.
Money laundering (Art. 502), on the other hand, becomes a continuous offense, meaning an offense that persists over time as long as the illicit situation continues. It now encompasses a broad range of behaviors: the possession, management, conversion, transfer, and concealment of property or income of illicit origin.
This classification as a continuous offense represents a major development, as it has direct consequences on the statute of limitations for criminal prosecution.
Self-laundering: a significant development

Under former Article 505 of the Criminal Code, the perpetrator of an offense could not, in principle, be prosecuted for money laundering when they merely possessed, managed, or retained the financial advantages they had themselves obtained through their offense. This solution aimed to prevent a person from being penalized a second time for the mere fact of holding the proceeds of their own crime.
This exception was gradually reduced, however. As early as 1995, certain money laundering behaviors could already be attributed to the perpetrator of the predicate offense. In 2007, the exception was further limited to offenses committed in Belgium.
The new Article 502 of the Criminal Code definitively removes this exception. Henceforth, any person who participated in the predicate offense (perpetrator, co-perpetrator, or accomplice) may be prosecuted for money laundering even if they merely retain or manage the illicit assets without carrying out any acts of concealment or transfer. The mere fact of continuing to benefit from an advantage of illicit origin now constitutes a separate offense.
A continuing offense: what consequences for the statute of limitations?
The continuous nature of money laundering profoundly alters the statute of limitations rules. Under Belgian criminal law, the statute of limitations for criminal prosecution generally begins to run only from the moment the offense ends. In the case of money laundering, this means that the statute of limitations only starts from the last act of holding, managing, or using the illicit patrimonial advantages.

In other words, as long as the author retains or continues to use the assets derived from the primary offense, the offense is considered ongoing.
Under the new regime, offences punishable by a level 1 to 3 penalty are time-barred after ten years (Law of 9 April 2024).
However, in practice, this limitation period can be continuously extended as long as the financial benefits remain held or exploited. This situation can significantly delay the acquisition of the statute of limitations and strengthen the possibilities for criminal prosecution over the long term.
What are the penalties for money laundering?

The new Criminal Code now combines principal penalties, accessory penalties, and aggravating factors, allowing the judge to tailor the sanction to the actual severity of the facts.
Type of penalty | Sanctions |
|---|---|
Main penalty | Level 3: 3 to 5 years of imprisonment (natural persons); €360,000 to €600,000 (legal persons) |
Accessory penalties | Fine of €200 to €2,000,000 or equivalent of the laundered assets; mandatory confiscation of illicit assets and their proceeds; extended confiscation under the conditions provided for by law |
Aggravating factors | Implication of minors or vulnerable persons; serious offense (level 7-8); professional perpetrator or regulated entity*; offense committed within the framework of a criminal organization |
*The entities subject to these obligations include banks, fiduciaries, and other professionals bound by anti-money laundering requirements.
Under Article 502, paragraph 4, confiscation may be ordered even where the asset does not belong to the convicted person.
Exemption from penalties for reporting entities: a strictly regulated protection
A penalty exemption (Art. 504) applies only to obligated entities that, in connection with money laundering linked to tax fraud other than serious tax fraud, have complied with anti-tax-fraud legislation, including the Law of 18 September 2017 on the prevention of money laundering. It covers only the behaviours in points 1° and 3° — not the conversion or transfer of illicit advantages (point 2°) — and does not extend to serious tax fraud.
Concretely, this exemption is only possible if the entity has properly identified its clients, exercised ongoing due diligence over the business relationship, and conducted a thorough analysis of suspicious transactions. It also presupposes that internal control and prevention mechanisms have been applied in good faith.

However, this exemption does not constitute automatic immunity. It remains subject to restrictive application and is still at the discretion of the judge, who will concretely assess whether the legal obligations have been fulfilled.
In practice, any negligence or passivity in the face of suspicious transactions may preclude the granting of this exemption.
By way of illustration, a bank that has carried out formal customer identification checks but has failed to seriously analyze unusual financial movements flagged by its monitoring system would likely not be eligible for this exemption. The mere existence of internal procedures is therefore insufficient: they must also be effectively and diligently applied.
What does the criminalization of fraudulent insolvency organization bring?
The reform is not limited to money laundering. The incrimination of fraudulent organisation of insolvency, which already existed under former Article 490bis, is restated in Article 496 of the new Code. It sanctions the debtor who fraudulently organises their own insolvency and fails to perform the obligations by which they are bound, without a formal bankruptcy being required. It complements the existing offences in the area of bankruptcy, such as:
Simple bankruptcy (Art. 490),
Fraudulent bankruptcy (Art. 491)
Fraudulent impairment of the assets or liabilities of a bankrupt person (Art. 492),
And embezzlement in the management of guardianship (Art. 493).
Concrete example: a debtor who deliberately empties their personal or business estate and then refuses to meet enforceable debts can be prosecuted under Article 496 even without a declared bankruptcy. By contrast, a director who transfers company assets to another entity typically falls under fraudulent bankruptcy (Art. 491) or impairment of assets (Art. 492), not Article 496.
For the offense to be established, several elements must be demonstrated:
The organisation of the insolvency;
The non-performance of the obligations by which the perpetrator is bound;
Fraudulent intent.

The fraudulent intent may notably be inferred from behaviors such as transfers of assets without real economic justification, transactions carried out under manifestly disadvantageous conditions, or the deliberate concealment of elements of the debtor's assets.
The prosecution will also need to establish a link between the acts committed and the artificial deterioration of the debtor's financial situation. This evidentiary requirement will be essential in distinguishing risky but lawful management choices from truly fraudulent behavior.
An accomplice third party who restores the assets may benefit from an excuse under Article 497.
The offense is punishable by a level 2 penalty, i.e., a sentence of 6 months to 3 years' imprisonment for natural persons and a fine of more than €20,000 up to €360,000 for legal entities.
These provisions allow earlier sanctioning of fraudulent self-impoverishment that undermines creditors' rights, including before the formal opening of bankruptcy proceedings, while remaining distinct from the bankruptcy offences that specifically target directors and impairment of company assets.
What are the practical impacts for economic actors?
Domain | Main impact | Scope |
|---|---|---|
Money laundering | All participants in the initial offense may be prosecuted (self-laundering). | Primary and third-party authors |
Confiscation | Mandatory and may extend to previously acquired assets | May target certain patrimonial assets under the conditions provided for by law. |
Sanctions of reporting entities | Narrow Art. 504 exemption only for non-serious tax-fraud laundering (points 1° and 3°) | Does not cover conversion/transfer or serious tax fraud |
Fraudulent organization of insolvency | Prosecution of the debtor (accomplices may benefit from Art. 497 restoration excuse) | Enhanced protection of creditors |
What obligated entities should do by 10 July 2027. AMLD6 must be transposed and the AMLR will apply from that date. Map remaining gaps against your AML framework (AMLD6 gap analysis for Belgium), refresh CDD and governance controls, and align operational readiness with the EU AML Package. Pideeco supports end-to-end remediation via AML/KYC frameworks.
What to remember?
The new Belgian Criminal Code marks a significant break with previous economic and financial criminal law and is not limited to mere technical adjustments.
The reform clarifies the distinction between handling stolen goods and money laundering, considerably broadens the scope of this offence, and fully establishes self-laundering as an autonomous and continuous offence. This development strongly enhances the possibilities for prosecution over time due to the postponement of the starting point of the statute of limitations.
At the same time, the restatement of fraudulent organisation of insolvency (Art. 496) allows earlier intervention against self-organised fraud to the detriment of creditors, including before the formal opening of bankruptcy proceedings.
Sanctions are redefined around a graduated panel, with an accessory fine of up to €2 million, mandatory confiscation, and broadened aggravating factors.
With the new Criminal Code in force since 1 September 2026, and in a European context of continuously strengthening anti-money laundering obligations, these developments require companies and professionals to act on governance, compliance, and internal controls.






